China’s rise as a major economic power has significantly reshaped its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with economic statecraft emerging as a central instrument of influence. This study examines how China employs economic incentives and coercive measures to shape the foreign policy behavior of ASEAN member states and assesses the implications for regional autonomy and stability. Economic statecraft in China–ASEAN relations operates through a dual-track approach: the provision of inducements such as trade access, foreign direct investment, infrastructure financing under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and development assistance, alongside coercive tools including trade restrictions, tourism bans, investment slowdowns, and informal sanctions.

The paper argues that while economic engagement has contributed to ASEAN’s growth and regional connectivity, it has also generated asymmetric dependencies that expose smaller economies to coercive pressure. Case studies of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Cambodia illustrate varying national responses shaped by domestic political structures, economic vulnerability, and strategic priorities. Some states have resisted coercion by diversifying partnerships and leveraging international law, while others have accommodated Chinese preferences in exchange for economic benefits.

At the regional level, ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making and commitment to non-interference have constrained collective responses to economic coercion, undermining ASEAN unity on sensitive issues such as the South China Sea. The analysis further situates China’s economic statecraft within broader US–China strategic competition, highlighting how Southeast Asian states pursue hedging strategies to balance economic reliance on China with security ties to other major powers.